Rich Country Corruption by Graycar, Adam
Archived at the Flinders Academic Commons: http://
dspace.flinders.edu.au/dspace/ 
‘This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 
Graycar, Adam & Monaghan Olivia (2105) “Rich Country 
Corruption”  International Journal of Public 
Administration Vol. 38, 586–595, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.949757
which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.949757
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by 
Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Public 
Administration on 5 May 2015, available online: http://
www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01900692.2014.949757”.
Copyright © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
All rights reserved.
1 
Graycar, Adam & Monaghan Olivia (2105) “Rich Country Corruption”  International Journal of 
Public Administration Vol. 38, 586–595, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.949757 
Rich Country Corruption 
Adam Graycar and Olivia Monaghan 
Adam Graycar (corresponding author) 
Professor of Public Policy, Research School of Social Sciences and Director of the 
Transnational Research Institute on Corruption (TRIC) at the Australian National University 
(ANU). 
Email: adam.graycar@anu.edu.au, Telephone: +61-2-6125 0135 
Olivia Monaghan 
Research Officer at the Transnational Research Institute on Corruption (TRIC) at the 
Australian National University (ANU). Olivia is a doctoral candidate researching corruption 
risks and anti-corruption policy for the police force at the University of Melbourne. 
Email: olivia.monaghan@anu.edu.au, Telephone: +61-2-6125 3902 
Affiliation: Research for this paper was conducted at the Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia. 
Disclosure statement: Adam Graycar and Olivia Monaghan do not work for, 
consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation 
that would benefit from this article, and have no relevant affiliations. 
2 
 
 
Rich Country Corruption 
Introduction 
The goal of this article is to better understand rich country corruption, and to highlight some 
of the challenges this creates for anti-corruption policy and practice.  Rich country 
corruption takes on a different form to most corruption in poor countries.  Corruption in 
poor countries affects the daily lives of the very poorest people, it makes them pay more for 
access to markets and services that people in rich countries use as a normal right of 
citizenship, it makes politicians into billionaires because they can manipulate business and 
the regulation of business, and use the state as their own personal plaything.  Corruption in 
rich countries is often about distorting a supposed level playing field, about using cronyism 
to gain advantage, and about distorting public administration to gain advantage by the 
unauthorised trading in influence, and gaining personal benefit along the way.  It often 
involves questionable lobbying, gaming the legislative process, or weakening environmental 
regulation, or sacrificing occupational health and safety concerns to the profits of 
corporations which provide funds for politicians. 
It has been more than three decades since Michael Johnston (Johnston 1982, xi) stated ‘I am 
convinced that before we condemn corruption, we must understand it’.  However, while 
there have been many definitions of corruption and arguments about definitions 
(Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine 2009; Johnston 1996; Kaufmann 1998) classifications 
are not common, and measurement is difficult.  
Angela Gorta (2006) notes that measuring corruption is not an end in its own right. 
Corruption measurement is simply a tool to achieve a purpose.  When considering the 
question of how to measure corruption, one should first consider why one is seeking to do 
so (Gorta 2006; Graycar and Prenzler 2013). This confirms that attempts to measure 
corruption, while they will never be 100% accurate, hold a purpose. When applying this 
purpose to rich country corruption, measurements need to be understood as producing 
quantitative results that are conservative at best, constrained by the clandestine nature of 
the phenomenon and different understandings of what constitutes corruption across 
different publics. 
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The commonplace nature of these corrupt occurrences in poor countries means that 
particular corrupt events seen as egregious in rich countries may not be met with a second 
glance in poor countries. The more wide-spread corrupt acts are, and the more people in a 
society who perceive a system to be corrupt, the more that corruption is likely to be viewed 
as normal (de Lancer Julnes and Villoria 2014, 23). The perceptions of corruption in rich and 
poor countries, and the role corruption plays across the two publics are not easily 
comparable. This in itself suggests that the same framework cannot be used to explain the 
phenomena of corruption in rich and poor countries. 
 
Classifying corruption 
Two theoretical approaches can help us understand how to classify and respond to rich 
country corruption. One is the “Syndromes” of corruption as developed by Michael 
Johnston in which governance and deal making reflect stage of economic and political 
development (Johnston 2005). Second is the classification of corruption events by type, 
activity, sector and place (TASP) developed by Graycar (Graycar and Prenzler 2013; Graycar 
and Sidebottom 2012) in which preventive approaches can be tailored to the way in which 
the corrupt event is classified and broken down into its component parts.  Both approaches 
can be used to examine poor country corruption as well as rich country corruption, but are 
particularly helpful in exploring the differences. 
Corruption can manifest in all development and service delivery sectors (Graycar and 
Prenzler 2013, 11) and can be found in all levels of government. No country or government 
department is immune from corruption, just as there is no single cause of corruption. 
Johnston’s “syndromes” of corruption are based on the understanding that corruption 
countermeasures will have a greater chance of addressing the causes, not just the 
symptoms, of corruption when they consider the factors that influence corruption– that is, 
the way people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power - within a particular society. 
Corruption ultimately has its roots in the long term development processes and political-
economic dynamics of a particular society, and therefore needs to be understood as context 
and location specific. The US Aid Corruption Assessment Handbook states that ‘the nature 
and spread of corruption in established democracies with reputable political and economic 
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institutions is likely to be of a different nature (and to be coped with differently) than in 
countries that are not firmly in control and markets that operate primarily in the informal 
sphere’ (Spector, Johnston, and Winbourne 2006, 9). In essence, corruption is different 
between countries with established democracies and those in a state of political-economic 
development or transition. By grouping countries that share common political and economic 
features we can identify corruption characteristics. This allows policymakers to have a 
sophisticated and realistic understanding of corruption, its underlying causes, and how to 
address it. 
Johnston identifies four “syndromes”. The first, Mature States Corruption, where wealth 
interests trade political contributions (often legally and openly), sees wealth used to 
influence specific decisions. An example of this is the often legal and necessary practice of 
lobbying. In the second, Elite Network-State Corruption, élites are connected by durable 
networks that share a strong stake in the status quo and corruption is moderate to 
extensive but controlled from above. The spoils of this corruption is shared among (and 
used to bind together) members of the élite. This is often seen in countries such as Italy, 
where the porous boundaries between big business, the judiciary and political leaders have 
created a ‘new’ political class (Della Porta and Vannucci 2007). Weak Transnational States 
Corruption is found where both politics and the economy are rapidly opening up, resulting 
in institutional insecurity. An example of this is Myanmar, where the recent ‘opening’ of the 
country has resulted in corruption and weakened security for local business (Reuters 2014). 
Weak Undemocratic States Corruption involves corrupt figures whose influence depends 
on their ability to put state power to personal use, and where personally-controlled state 
power intrudes into the economy, as seen with Mugabe in Zimbabwe (Mavhunga and Karimi 
2013). These four syndromes essentially target corruption as it occurs along the spectrum of 
political development. The first two relate to corruption as it occurs in rich countries, and 
the second two to corruption in poor countries. For example, gaming (as described later) 
would be a better fit as a symptom of Mature State Corruption than Weak Undemocratic 
States Corruption, where corrupt figures do not rely as heavily on third parties to influence 
their decisions. 
While there are a number of taxonomies and typologies of corruption (Brown 2008; 
Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2007; OECD 2012; Sampford et al. 
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2006; Transparency International UK 2014; Rumyantseva 2005; Holmes 2006a), TASP takes 
it one step further by using an analytical model that aims to elucidate the nature of 
corruption as it occurs in a particular setting. It does this by identifying the Type of 
corruption, the Activity performed, the Sector in which it has manifested, and the Place in 
which it occurs. The types of corruption identified in TASP are bribery, extortion, 
misappropriation, self-dealing, conflict of interest, abuse of discretion, patronage, nepotism, 
cronyism, trading in influence, and “pay to play”. Some potential activities are appointing 
personnel, buying things (procurement), delivering programmes or services, making things, 
controlling activities, and administering. The sectors are main government and industry 
sectors, such as construction, health, tax administration, customs and immigration, welfare 
systems, and agriculture, among others. Places can be either geographic localities (such as 
countries and regions) or workplaces. By dissecting corruption across these four 
dispositions, the TASP model can be used to help develop mechanisms to counter activities 
that may undermine the principles of good governance by identifying how and where 
corruption occurs.  
If we take the first item in the model, bribery, there is universal agreement that bribery is a 
significant type of corruption in rich and poor countries alike.  There is more bribery in 
poorer countries and it affects the daily lives of most citizens.  This is not the main 
corruption story in richer countries. 
Without getting into definitions of rich and poor countries1, some data on bribery from the 
2013 Global Corruption Barometer clearly illustrates the point.  The survey reported the 
percentage of the population that had paid a bribe to a public official in the previous year. 
 
TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
For example, 84% of people surveyed in Sierra Leone reported paying a bribe for a public 
service. In Finland, Denmark, Japan and Australia, this figure was just 1%. In these rich 
                                                     
1 Rich countries are here understood to be countries that are rich in levels of social, economic, and political 
development that are placed in the ‘High Income’ category of the World Bank Development Indicators (2013). 
The poor countries chosen here represent the opposite end of that spectrum.  
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countries, demands for bribes would cause outrage.  What is commonplace in some 
countries is regarded as particularly egregious in others.   When influential people in rich 
countries use influence and connections to secure political deals which enrich them or their 
families (rezoning of land, monopolies in provision of goods and services, awarding of 
lucrative contracts) there is outrage. This was recently seen in the Australian state of New 
South Wales, where the case of former Member of Parliament, Eddie Obeid, being involved 
in cronyism, insider trading, and land tendering attracted significant media attention 
(Monaghan 2013). In a country such as Nigeria, where the influence, wealth, and ownership 
of both land and big business rarely occurs outside the ruling classes, writes Mills (2010, 3) 
the activities that attract headlines in rich countries  would be considered commonplace.  
Indeed, as Chabal and Daloz (1999, 16) state, ‘in most African countries, the state is no more 
than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political 
relations [where] legitimacy is firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons and 
their networks.’ 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer probes confidence in institutions 
(Table 2) and it can be seen how some richer and poorer countries compare. 
 
TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Without analysing these numbers in detail, of the four institutions which respondents rated 
for corruption, the media achieves a high score of perceived corruption across both rich and 
poor countries.  Notably, of the four institutions the media was judged the least corrupt in 
the poorer countries, while in the richer countries the media was perceived as the most 
corrupt.  
One potential explanation of this is cynicism. In poor countries, where kleptocrats reign 
unchecked and where the state is often captured to their interests, one could assume that 
they also had some influence or control over the media or were able to ignore the media, or 
rein it in when required. Further, in countries where corruption is a part of everyday life, it 
would be reasonable that a citizen assumes that the media is also corrupt. That the media 
rates lower than other institutions in poor countries suggests that it still enjoys a relatively 
higher level of public trust.  
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In contrast, in rich countries where the media ranks relatively higher than other institutions 
in terms of perceived corruption, this can be attributed to a cynicism directed at the system.  
A free and thorough media exposes corruption, reports on corrupt activity, and shapes the 
views of a public in terms of what is acceptable behaviour and what is not.  However, there 
have been many examples where the media is accused of being partisan, or where the 
media is itself the focus of misconduct allegations (eg. News of the World and the Leveson 
Inquiry in the UK - see Kellner 2012; Leveson 2012).  There are also cases of journalists with 
dubious ethics who quote out of context, misrepresent comments, hound and stalk some 
public officials (and public figures), and manipulate facts and interpretations to get their 
stories.  The public often judges this to be corrupt. 
Table 3 reports data from a national poll in Australia where respondents were asked their 
perceptions of corruption in certain national institutions, and the rankings in final column is 
the difference between those who think that institution is affected by corruption and those 
who do not think so.  The least corrupt, as perceived in Australia are the armed forces, and 
the most corrupt are the media.  This would not be replicated in any of the poorer 
countries. 
 
TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The World Bank Governance Indicators provide a ranking of countries across a range of 
indicators based on similar variables, these are in Table 4. Ranked by percentage, these 
figures highlight the difference in perceptions of corruption between rich and poor 
countries.  
 
TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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All data in the governance indicator is drawn from perceptions of corruption, compiled using 
surveys of households and firms, commercial business information providers, non-
governmental organisations, and public sector organisations. 
 
Corruptly getting results in rich countries 
Media reports of corruption in rich countries focus more on lobbying, conflicts of interest 
and gaming the system than on bribery or extortion or misappropriation. 
In the state of New South Wales, Australia’s largest state, political life was fractured in April 
2014 when a popularly elected Premier, who had a huge parliamentary majority, resigned 
abruptly because he did not declare a gift of a bottle of very expensive wine (Monaghan 
2014; Shanahan and Coultan 2014). The revelations came during an inquiry by the state’s 
anti-corruption agency which was examining the dealings of some ex-politicians who were 
hoping to obtain huge contracts for construction of water infrastructure and supply of water 
to growing population areas.  If successful, their families stood to make tens of millions of 
dollars, and they had used a range of covert and overt lobbying techniques to achieve their 
objectives.  They had placed influential people with political connections into key company 
positions, had unconscionable contracts written where state authorities were paying 
millions in salaries for very little work, and billing huge entertainment expenses to the state.  
One of their lobbyists gave the wine to the Premier, who in sworn testimony denied 
receiving it, though later evidence show it had been received.  At no stage was the Premier 
accused of corruption, but it was his veracity that was questioned.  This led to questions 
about the boundaries to the legitimate pursuit of corruption.  While gifts are common in 
poor countries, it struck a particularly raw nerve when exposed in Australia. 
Lobbying is a regular feature of democratic politics.  Lobbying remains not only a legal 
component of the democratic political system, but an integral component of contemporary 
democracy and governance. However, this is seen in both academic literature and 
contemporary policy making efforts as creating a clear corruption risk. Interests are 
advocated and represented, and it is a form of influence where deals are often done 
without transparency.  As Campos and Giovannoni (2007, 1) identify, both corruption and 
lobbying involve ‘obtaining help from the public sector in exchange for some favor’. Indeed, 
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lobbying is a significant corruption risk factor where financial contributions could be 
interpreted either as campaign donations or bribes (Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Coate 
and Morris 1999; Grossman and Helpman 2001; Lessig 2011; Svensson and Harstad 2006).  
When legislators and personnel in rule-making agencies are lobbied, that is fine.  But when 
they are given gifts with an expectation of a quid pro quo then the bounds of democracy 
have been overstepped. 
Lobbying does not occur only in rich countries. Campos and Giovannoni’s (2007) study of 
lobbying, corruption and influence examines lobby and interest groups in 25 former Soviet 
states in the post-Cold War transition period, found that lobbying is often an important 
alternative instrument to corruption in transition countries. The considerable amount of 
money funnelled into lobbying in rich countries creates a worrying scale of corruption risk 
not possible in countries with lesser economies. For example, it is estimated that the 2012 
lobbying spending of the United States health sector was $490 million (Centre for 
Responsive Politics 2014), a figure higher than the 2012 annual Gross Domestic Products 
(GDPs) of some of the world’s poorest countries (The World Bank 2012). 
Some American states require lobbyists or lobby firms to register or report annual spending, 
other states do not, and thus data on lobbying in America can be unreliable.  As an indicator 
of the sustained growth of the industry, Hacker and Pierson (2010) reported that, in 1971, 
175 firms had registered lobbyists in Washington, DC.  Huffington (2011) found that, by 
1981, this figure had increased to 2,500.  In 2009, there were 13,700 lobbyists registered in 
Washington DC alone, with a combined reported annual spend of more than $3.8 billion 
(Balko 2009). This level of expenditure on lobbying cannot be matched in poor countries. 
Annual, country wide figures of American lobbying should thus be understood as estimates 
based on a high-growth industry; one which plays with more money and power than a poor 
country is capable of.  
This, however, raises the second, and perhaps more salient, point of distinction between 
corruption and lobbying – the issue of legality.  Corruption is illegal in just about every 
country, yet lobbying is not.  Lobbying is a rapidly growing industry that has the potential to 
corrupt absolutely, it is a state-sanctioned industry and activity that when used with good 
intentions, enables the ongoing functionality of government. While lobbying serves a valid 
10 
 
function in the operation of democracy (albeit one open to misuse), corruption does not. 
Campos and Giovannoni (2007) found the relationship between the two is inverted – the 
more corrupt a country is the less likely individual firms are to engage in lobbying. The need 
for lobbying as a legitimate means of political influence is negated by the option to engage 
in corruption. Lobbying is more likely to take root in rich countries, and to cause concerns.  
It finds a place in systems that enjoy high levels of political stability (Campos and Giovannoni 
2007).  It is a phenomenon that exists on the fringe of corruption, where the grey areas of 
immorality and progress intersect.  
Lobbying undoubtedly adds to corruption risk levels, but it is not the only form of rich 
country corruption. Narrowing the focus of corruption in rich countries to lobbying and 
financially-motivated corruption risks creating an unbalanced understanding of corruption. 
If we know the nature of corruption in a country, remedial actions can be implemented and 
adequate preventative measures can be put in place.  This is where the Syndromes and 
TASP analysis (outlined above) can be of use. 
Lobbying can morph into “gaming the system”.  According to Salter (2010, 2), ‘gaming in its 
various forms involves the use of technically legal means to subvert society’s rules in order 
to gain advantage over rivals.’  Gaming can be seen as an umbrella term that accounts for 
existing “grey area” or “legal corruption” acts, such as lobbying, petitioning, and political 
bargaining, to name a few.  Two examples illustrate this point. 
A recent report from West Virginia in the US shows how the system has been gamed by 
advocates for the coal industry (Osnos 2014).  In the process, benefits have accrued to 
legislators, and detriments to the community as environmental regulation falls victim to 
local politics, and occupational health and safety issues are corruptly disregarded.   In 
January 2014, West Virginia experienced one of the most serious incidents of chemical 
contamination of drinking water in American history (Osnos 2014). The chemicals for nearby 
coal mines are stored on a bluff above Elk River, just outside of the capital Charleston. A leak 
in one of the storage containers saw large quantities of the chemical MCHM leak into the 
river, and subsequently into West Virginia’s largest water treatment plant. The chemical, 
used in the coal mines that provide the backbone to West Virginia’s economy, was untested 
for human exposure or consumption, and the leak has been attributed to a range of health 
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issues including rashes, nausea and headaches (Osnos 2014). The coal lobby groups 
representing the state’s biggest industry wield significant power and have helped make 
West Virginia a flag-bearer for pro-business and limited government conservatism (Osnos 
2014). In doing so the coal delegations have significant control over the political dialogue, 
and politicians who oppose weakening coal regulations find themselves without enough 
financial backing to win elections. Benefits are given to legislators in return for their 
support, and the political lives of those who wish to regulate the industry are curtailed. 
Ultimately, this case study is an example of gaming the system (Salter 2010) whereby 
decisions are made to benefit a few, at the cost of many.  
A recent corruption scandal to hit the Australian state of New South Wales similarly involves 
the use of political connections to influence policy and further personal power and wealth. 
Since February 2013 Eddie Obeid, a former Member of Parliament and political heavyweight 
in NSW has been involved in a number of cases heard before the Independent Commission 
against Corruption (ICAC). The first, Operation Jaspar, saw Obeid face allegations of insider 
trading (ICAC 2013). It was found that Obeid and his sons misused information provided by 
the then-state Minister for Resources, Ian Macdonald, to turn $200,000 of land investments 
into an potential $100 million profit (ICAC 2013; Monaghan 2013). At the time of writing, 
Obeid and members of his family are appearing before ICAC as part of two other 
investigations involving an alleged misuse of political influence, illegal party financing, and 
the falsification of cabinet documents. In the case of Operation Jaspar, Obeid was found to 
have acted corruptly (ICAC 2013). Obeid’s activities have been examined in the media and 
have been met with strong public opprobrium. Obeid’s exercise of political influence, had it 
happened in a poor country, would cause much less public condemnation and disapproval 
where citizens are more concerned with the challenges of everyday life. 
A similar form of gaming focusing on conflict of interest was evident in the operations of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).  Here conflict of interest was evident in 
membership of key policy committees in 2013.  The EFSA is in charge of assessing all 
potential food related products, and all current food related products on the European 
market. This not only involves a scope to assess, test, and monitor the safety of consumable 
food goods, but also the packaging, as well as the medicine and feed given to livestock. 
Further, it monitors all issues involving processed ingredients, such as acceptable or 
12 
 
unacceptable chemicals, pesticides and their residues. The EFSA advises on policy and 
legislation to support the European Commission, the European Union (EU) Parliament, and 
EU current and future Member States on food risks and food management (Horel and 
Corporate Europe Observatory 2013).   
A 2013 Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) review of the EFSA found ongoing and 
widespread practices of conflict of interest, including ties to lobbying and interest groups. Of 
the 209 food safety experts at the EFSA, 122 (60%) were found to have at least one 
unreported conflict of interest with a related industry. The “worst offender” was the panel 
on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies panel where 17 of its 20 members totalled 113 
unreported conflicts of interests between them (Horel and Corporate Europe Observatory 
2013).  All except one of their panels were impacted by conflicts of interest. It is 
conscionable that experts in a field would have established ties within their professional 
community; however, the sheer number of conflicts of interest found, and the fact the CEO 
review occurred a year after the EFSA had implemented policies on reporting conflict of 
interest makes this an example of grey area, legal corruption (Horel and Corporate Europe 
Observatory 2013). Further, while conflict of interest and lobbying both remain legal, the 
potential impact from any fall-out from this example demonstrates the corruption grey area 
created by some forms of corruption in rich countries. 
The CEO report on the EFSA case resulted in an Ombudsman inquiry (European Ombudsman 
2013). The fact that these cases of conflict of interest elicited such a response despite there 
being no confirmed cases of public harm reflects the nature of corruption in rich countries. 
In poor countries, often (to return to Johnston’s syndromes) weak undemocratic states, 
where politics relies on capitalised business and familial networks that advance the power 
and wealth of the élite, the EFSA case would not be considered worthy of investigation or 
reporting.   
These examples of “legal corruption” fits within Malcolm Salter’s (2010) articulation of 
“gaming”. To Salter, gaming is a way to subvert the intent of socially mandated or legislated 
rules for private gain without resorting to blatantly illegal acts (Salter 2010, 3).  As well as 
lobbying to have legislation and regulations written in a way to advantage special interests 
(with rewards for public officials on the side), gaming can include, but is not limited to, 
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maximised reported earnings, maintaining high credit ratings, preserving access to capital 
on favourable terms, or reaping personal rewards.  Gaming thus exists in the penumbra 
between legitimate conduct that advances democratic capitalist function, and conduct that 
advances the interests of a few.  
In this sense, gaming is a rich country phenomenon because in poor countries there is no 
need to “game”. Kleptocrats either steal blatantly or political leaders have captured the 
state so effectively that the niceties of due process are not part of regular expectations. The 
political development thus needed to facilitate lobbying (Campos and Giovannoni 2007) is 
not present in poor countries. Rather, politics is conducted to maximise the interests of the 
kleptocrats, not the people. Therefore, while acts similar to gaming may occur in poor 
countries (ie. using your own power or connections to self-maximise), they are not met with 
the same levels of incredulity as in rich countries. The commonplace nature of gaming in 
poor countries means most citizens would not give it a second glance, it is part of the 
process rather than a problem. So, while lobbying and gaming are linked, they form a key 
point of difference between corruption in rich and poor countries.  
Where Salter’s (2010) articulation of “gaming” differs from existing literatures on lobbying is 
in his inclusion of “socially mandated” rules. Salter (2010, 3) contends there is an 
inextricable link between the public, gaming, and trust, as: 
Gaming crosses the line of acceptability and becomes institutionally corrupt when 
such institution-sanctioned behaviour subverts the intent of society’s rules, thereby 
harming public interest, or weakens the capacity of the institution to achieve its 
espoused goals by undermining its legitimate procedures and core values. 
Legitimate conduct thus becomes “gaming” when it harms public interest, and it becomes 
institutional corruption when it undermines the values supposedly upheld by those 
behaving improperly. The link between this and trust is seen in the effect of this conduct on 
democratic function, most notably in the response made to such conduct.   Few institutions 
in a democratic society can survive in the long run in the absence of public trust (Salter 
2010, 4). The degree to which legitimate conduct harms public interest and trust is central in 
determining when otherwise acceptable (and often necessary) acts become “gaming the 
system”. 
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In the EFSA example above, one would expect expertise on the panels, but when that is 
transformed into conflicts of interest, the processes become questionable.  The system is 
being gamed when the panels expose themselves to numerous, unreported, competing 
conflicts of interest so that they are subverting both the society’s rules of acceptable 
conduct and the organisation’s rules of reporting conflicts of interest. Further, by not 
reporting conflicts of interest, panel members effectively fail the sunlight test, keeping an 
event in the dark when one is able to safely report it. This suggests members knew it was 
wrong (Holmes 2006b, 11). The EFSA example thus becomes an example of gaming the 
system as it ultimately harms the public interest, it undermines the societal values and 
values of the organisation, and it weakens the capacity for the organisation to effectively do 
its job.  
When lobbying as a part of genuine political activity crosses the line in to gaming is when 
the favours being traded no longer benefit the public. A loss of public trust has crippled 
companies (News of the World, and Enron for example - see Gibney 2005; Kirkup 2011; 
McLean and Elkind 2003) just as they have governments, and given an impression of 
widespread corruption.   
As lobby groups exist to further the interests of a particular sub-public (whether it be 
shareholders or community groups), it stands to reason a particular public could benefit 
from gaming. In the EFSA example, those employed in the European food industry (or within 
companies misusing their conflicts of interests) stood to benefit from the gaming, as did 
their companies. What makes this an uncomfortable fit with genuine political activity 
however, is that it failed to serve the interests of the public as a whole.  Gaming occurs in 
both rich and poor countries; however, as lobbying is traditionally associated with (albeit 
problematically) rich country corruption, and as gaming encompasses acts of lobbying, it 
acts as an example of the nuanced nature of corruption in rich countries, and is often seen 
as particularly egregious. 
 
Corruption, felt but not seen 
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Having looked at gaming and lobbying we now turn to perceptions of corruption at the 
coalface, within the community and the civil service. The data reported here are from a 
series of surveys carried out in Victoria (Australia’s second most populous state).  These 
highlight the types of corruption perceived in a rich country.  As shown above in Table 3, no 
Australian institution was perceived by a majority to be corrupt, and for all but three 
institutions (media, trade unions, political parties) more people thought they were not 
corrupt than thought they were corrupt. Table 3 shows Australian national figures, but the 
results in Victoria are much the same.  
The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) does not ask the questions in the same way, but 
perusal of the barometer would show a different pattern of perceptions of institutional 
corruption in poorer countries.  A simple illustration is that in Australia, after the military, 
the police were regarded as the least corrupt institution. Data produced in the GCB 
(Transparency International 2013) found in contrast, that in the majority of poor countries 
the police are ranked as among the most corrupt institutions. This potentially reflects 
differing levels of public trust and personal engagement with the government.  
This interesting trend of low experience/high perceptions is confirmed in the ANUPoll on 
Perceptions on Corruption (McAllister, Pietsch, and Graycar 2012). This national poll in 
Australia found 43% of respondents thought corruption was increasing, yet less than 1% had 
themselves often been asked for a bribe. The survey was conducted after a prominent 
Australian company was defending itself against allegations of international bribery. Given 
the high levels of media attention in this case, media reporting and cynicism can again be 
seen as potential motivators for the high levels of perceived corruption in Australia. 
The results in Victoria were consistent with those nationally. The weak relationship between 
experiences of corruption and perceptions that it has increased suggests perceptions of 
corruption in Australia is rooted ‘more in indirect sources of information, such as the mass 
media’, rather than in lived experience (McAllister, Pietsch, and Graycar 2012, 12). This is 
perhaps the biggest point of difference between corruption in rich countries and poor 
countries.   While rich countries may record significant levels of perceived corruption, they 
are not rooted in actual levels of corruption. In poor countries, however, perceptions of 
corruption are caused by lived corruption. For example, table 2 above shows 82 percent of 
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respondents in Kyrgyzstan believe the education sector to be corrupt, and 48 percent of 
respondents claim to have paid a bribe to the education sector. In Australia for example, 19 
percent perceive the same sector to be corrupt, yet fewer than 1 percent report paying a 
bribe (in any sector). In Denmark and Finland the numbers are much lower with negligible 
perceptions of corruption with even less direct experience. 
A survey was conducted by one of the authors with senior civil servants working in the 
government of Victoria, and 839 responded. In general few had views about whether 
corruption had increased or decreased in the past five years – 17% of the public servants 
surveyed thought corruption had increased in Victoria in the past 5 years, while 9% thought 
it had decreased.  Three quarters either did not know or thought it had stayed the same.  
(See Fig 1) 
 
FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
85% thought there was little or no corruption in their departments, or did not know if there 
was. 
 
FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The study provides data on the factors which are seen to be the greatest corruption risks, 
further demonstrating the differing types of corruption that occur in rich countries (below) 
While corruption risks were generally rated low, respondents more readily identified the 
factors considered to not be a corruption risk in the Victorian public service. Where 
corruption risks were identified they were in appointing personnel (29%), buying goods and 
services (24%), and partnerships with the private sector (19%). 
 
TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Respondents were asked about corruption types and activities They were asked for each 
type whether in their agencies there was an opportunity for that type of corruption, and  
whether they had either suspected or observed that type of corrupt behaviour. 
 
TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
While respondents thought there were corruption risks, this did not fully manifest itself in 
corrupt behaviour, either suspected or observed.  Corrupt behaviours most commonly 
suspected and observed in the Victorian data are hiring of family and friends, conflict of 
interest, abuse of discretion, and abuse of information. This is in line with the most 
frequently identified opportunities for corruption within the respondent’s current 
department or agency: conflict of interest, misuse of information, abuse of discretion, and 
hiring friends or family for public service jobs. One point to note is that while respondents 
perceived the existence of opportunities, these were not visibly consummated.  These are 
all reasonably commonplace actions in poor countries; countries with cultures that 
encourage nepotism, or countries whereby the élite few have the power. Behaviours 
considered corrupt in rich countries, are often the way of life in poor countries. 
The survey also focussed on issues that would not be at the forefront of a similar survey in a 
poorer country.  These additional questions were on confidence in reporting corruption, 
confidence in whether the agency would handle reports well, and on whether there would 
be any victimization of those who reported. 
The survey concluded with an open ended question asking what people perceived as the 
greatest corruption risks in the Victorian government.  The majority (68%) of respondents 
(and note, these are senior civil servants) either did not know (59%) or preferred not to 
identify (7%) any emerging risks for the organisation in which they currently worked.  36% of 
those who gave a response most commonly cited abuse of power as an emerging corruption 
risk.  
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Conclusion 
To return to Johnston’s comment that we must understand corruption before working on it, 
the TASP framework above gives us tools to start this understanding.  The types of 
corruption, and the frequency with which corrupt events occur, differ between rich and 
poor countries. The survey work and global data show common manifestations of 
corruption such as bribery and extortion which are strongly prevalent in some poorer 
countries, are not major features in richer countries (though of course, they exist). The 
literature on rich country corruption focuses often on lobbying and political manipulation. 
This approach needs to be enhanced to address the nuances of corruption in rich countries, 
and the extent to which the majority of it exists in the penumbra of genuine, legal political 
activity, and activity that advances the interests of a few. Gaming is a clear example of this 
type of corruption. A lack of commonly used classifications of corruption in rich countries 
hinders effective, targeted, long-term reform. By applying the TASP model, corrupt events 
can be broken down into four dispositions (types, activities, sectors and places) allowing for 
a closer and more detailed analysis of the act and its roots. In doing so, targeted remedial 
actions can be drafted. Managing levels of corruption in rich countries, where most corrupt 
acts are viewed as egregious and are less common than in poorer countries, requires an 
approach that moves away from a blanket anti-corruption policy to interventions that 
attempt to understand and better reflect the nature of the corruption in various types of 
settings.  The data analysed in this paper demonstrates if the predominant academic model 
for corruption prevention is built on data from poor countries then the building of integrity 
systems in rich countries can be a fraught activity. 
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Tables (with captions) on separate pages 
 
Table 1 Bribes paid for public service (%)  
Country % 
Sierra Leone 84 
Zimbabwe 62 
Kyrgyzstan  45 
Liberia 75 
Finland 1 
Denmark 1 
Japan 1 
Australia 1 
Canada 3 
Source:  (Transparency International 2013) 
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Table 2 Perceptions of corruption, by institution (%)  (percentage of population regarding that institution/ 
sector as corrupt.) 
Country Parliament Education Judiciary Media 
Sierra Leone 53 64 74 47 
Zimbabwe 69 67 69 65 
Kyrgyzstan 77 82 89 37 
Liberia 96 87 89 53 
Finland 31 7 9 35 
Denmark 18 6 5 30 
Germany 48 19 20 54 
UK 55 18 24 69 
France 52 16 34 54 
Australia 36 19 28 58 
New Zealand 33 16 20 43 
Source: (Transparency International 2013) 
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Table 3 ‘To what extent do you see the following institutions being affected by corruption?’ 
 Corrupt % Neither % Not corrupt % Don’t know % Corrupt-Not 
Corrupt % 
The armed forces 8 19 69 4 -61 
The public service 13 32 51 4 -38 
The police 16 27 56 1 -40 
Australian 
companies 
18 36 40 6 -22 
Local government 19 31 48 2 -29 
The legal system 23 33 41 3 -18 
The state 
government 
25 36 36 3 -11 
Banks and financial 
institutions 
25 30 42 3 -17 
The federal 
government in 
Canberra 
32 34 32 2 0 
Political parties 37 38 22 3 +15 
Trade unions 38 31 24 7 +14 
The media 44 34 20 2 +24 
Source: (McAllister, Pietsch, and Graycar 2012) 
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Table 4: World Wide Governance Indicators, percentile ranking of all countries from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest)  
 Rule of Law Government effectiveness Control of corruption 
Sierra Leone 22 10 19 
Zimbabwe 2 11 5 
Kyrgyzstan 12 29 13 
Liberia 18 12 34 
Finland 100 100 98 
Denmark 98 99 100 
Australia 95 94 96 
Canada 95 95 95 
Source: (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2013) 
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Table 5 Perception of risk of corruption at respondent's department (%) 
  Risk  Not a risk 
Appointing personnel 29.1 47.3 
Buying goods or services 24.5 48.6 
Partnership with private sector 22.7 52.3 
Controlling activities 22.6 56.6 
Ensuring compliance with procedures 18.2 54.8 
Grant administration 15.5 63.4 
Disposal and sale of organisational assets 14.0 65.0 
Using discretionary powers 13.3 63.0 
Sponsorship arrangements 12.6 66.3 
Source: Author survey 
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Table 6: Suspected and observed corruption within current organisation, Victoria, % (N = 893) 
 
Corruption in Department/Agency Opportunity Suspected Observed 
Hiring friends or family for public service 
jobs 
53 38 25 
Conflict of interest 72 38 20 
Misuse of information or material 68 32 15 
Abuse of discretion 58 28 15 
Hiring one’s own company, or the 
company belonging to close associates 
or relatives to provide public services 
33 18 9 
Perverting the course of justice 16 3 2 
Bribery 32 4 1 
Don’t know 3 6 4 
Prefer not to say 0 1 4 
Source: Author survey 
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Figures with captions as a list 
 
Figure 1: Perceived Change in Level of Corruption in Victoria (N = 839) 
Source: Author survey 
 
 
Figure 2: Perceived Level of Corruption in own Department, Victoria (N = 839) 
Source: Author survey 
 
 
